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BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant to the Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, Section 1 et,
seg, Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (h), and Rules 3 and 4 of the
Utah Rules of Appellant Procedure.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court commit error in failing to make

findings on nearly all material issues, including:
A.

Whether Stuart Williamson's $3,550.00 gross per

month income at the time of his involuntary termination from
Morton International, Inc. due to unsatisfactory job
performance should be imputed to Stuart Williamson for
purposes of child support and alimony;

B.

Whether Stuart Williamson is voluntarily

underemployed at $11.00 per hour when there is allegedly
employment available to him at $13.00 to $15.00 per hour;
C.

The effect of a new spouse's contributions to

Stuart Williamson's household on Stuart Williamson's needs
and ability to pay alimony;
D.

The parties' needs and respective abilities to meet

those needs relative to alimony, and equalization of the
parties' respective standards of living; and
E.

The reasonableness of Joan Williamson's attorneys

fees and costs and the relative abilities of the parties to
pay attorneys fees and costs.
2.

Did the trial court commit error in failing to award

Joan Williamson continued alimony even based upon the trial
court's findings of $2,090.00 gross monthly income to Stuart
Williamson and $1,692.00 gross monthly income to Joan Williamson
representing a $400.00 per month gross income disparity.
3.

Did the trial court commit error in failing to award

Joan Williamson her attorneys fees and costs.
4.

Whether Joan Williamson should be awarded her attorneys

fees and costs on appeal.
APPLICABLE STATUES
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.6(6) and (7):
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the parent
under Subsection (7).
2

(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless
the parent stipulates to the amount imputed or a
hearing is held and a finding made that the parent is
voluntarily unemployed or underemployed,
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall
be based upon employment potential and probable
earnings as derived from work history, occupation
qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of
similar backgrounds in the community.
(c) If a parent has no recent work history, income
shall be imputed at least at the federal minimum wage
for a 40-hour work week. To impute a greater income,
the judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding
officer in an administrative proceeding shall enter
specific findings of fact as to the evidentiary basis
for the imputation.
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following
conditions exist:
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for
the parents7 minor children approach or equal the
amount of income the custodial parent can earn;
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally
disabled to the extent he cannot earn minimum
wage;
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or
occupational training to establish basic job
skills; or
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of
a child require the custodial parent's presence in
the home.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (7) (a), (d) and (g):
(7) (a) The court shall consider at least the
following factors in determining alimony:
(i) the financial condition and needs of the
recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or
ability to produce income;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to
provide support; and
(iv) the length of the marriage.
3

(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances,
attempt to equalize the parties7 respective standards
of living.
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make
substantive changes and new orders regarding alimony
based on a substantial material change in circumstances
not foreseeable at the time of the divorce.
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or
issue a new order for alimony to address needs of
the recipient that did not exist at the time the
decree was entered, unless the court finds
extenuating circumstances that justify that
action.
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of
any subsequent spouse of the payor may not be
considered, except as provided in this subsection.
A. The court may consider the
subsequent spouse's financial ability to
share living expenses.
B. The court may consider the income or
a subsequent spouse if the court finds that
the payor's improper conduct justifies that
consideration.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 (1):
(1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter
3, 4 or 6, and in any action to establish an order of
custody, visitation, child support, alimony, or
division of property in a domestic case, the court may
order a party to pay the costs, attorney fees, and
witness fees, including expert witness fees, of the
other party to enable the other party to prosecute or
defend the action. The order may include provision for
costs of the action.

4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case,

This is a case involving

modification of the child support provision and termination of
the alimony provision of a Decree of Divorce.
B.

Course of Proceedings.

The parties were divorced by

Decree of Divorce entered May 2, 1996. On or about September 27,
1996, Stuart Williamson filed a Petition to Modify the child
support provisions of the Decree of Divorce.

On or about October

3, 1997, Stuart Williamson filed an Amended Petition to Modify
seeking termination of the alimony provided in the Decree of
Divorce.

Trial was held on Stuart Williamson's petition on

February 11, 1998. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
Order Modifying the Decree of Divorce were entered March 25,
1998.

Joan Williamson filed her Notice of Appeal on April 22,

1998.

Copies are found in the Brief of Joan Williamson.

C.

Disposition in the Trial Court:

Finding that Stuart

Williamson's income was different than at the time of the entry
of the Decree of Divorce, the trial court found a "change in
circumstances", reduced child support, terminated alimony, and
ordered each party to pay their own attorneys fees and costs.
D.

Statement of Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented for

Review:
1.

Joan Williamson and Stuart Williamson were married for

twenty-three (23) plus years. The parties have two children, one

5

of whom, Julie, is still a minor, born on September 23, 1985 and
in the custody of Joan Williamson.

R. 48, 66, 67 and 82. T.

page 130, lines 2-4.
2.

Joan Williamson and Stuart Williamson were divorced by

a Decree of Divorce entered on the 24th day of May, 1996. R. 8296.

A copy of the Decree of Divorce is included in the

Appellant's Addendum.

The Decree of Divorce was based upon a

Stipulation of the parties. R. 47-65.
3.

The Decree of Divorce provided for child support and

alimony as follows:
4. [Stuart Williamson] shall pay to [Joan Williamson]
the sum of $368.00 per month as child support until such
time as the payments are no longer due, which shall be when
the child turns 18 or would graduate from high school with
her normal high school class, whichever occurs later
6. [Stuart Williamson] shall maintain health, medical
and dental insurance on the minor child of the parties
8. [Stuart Williamson] is required to pay [Joan
Williamson] alimony in the sum of $425.00 per month until
[Joan Williamson] remarries or cohabits as defined in Utah
Code § 30-3-5, or either party dies. Alimony shall commence
July 1, 1995.
R. 83-85.
4*

At the time of the divorce, Stuart Williamson, was

employed at Morton International, Inc. where he earned
approximately $3,550.00 gross per month.

Joan Williamson was

employed at Bourns where she earned approximately $1,442.00 gross
per month.

R. 61, 77 and 92. T. page 12, lines 13-24.

6

5.

On or about September 27, 1996, Stuart Williamson filed

a Petition to Modify and reduce the child support provisions of
the Decree of Divorce. R. 116-20.

On or about October 3, 1997,

Stuart Williamson filed an Amended Petition to Modify which added
a request to modify by reducing or terminating the alimony
provision of the Decree of Divorce. R. 141-467.
6.

Stuart Williamson was involuntarily terminated from his

employment at Morton International, Inc. by a letter dated August
29, 1996, which stated the reason for termination to be a
"violation of Company Policy; specifically unsatisfactory
performance of job responsibilities."

The letter also stated

that Stuart Williamson could request review of his termination:
"If you are dissatisfied with any aspect of your termination, you
may review the Morton Automotive Safety Products Employee
Handbook as it pertains to the Employee Grievance Process."
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 4;

T. page 12, line 25; page 13, lines

1-3; page 16, lines 2-6; page 16, lines 19-25; page 17; page 18,
lines 1-5; page 23, lines 13-25; pages 24-32; page 33, lines 1-9;
page 95, lines 18-25; page 96; page 97, lines 1-3.
7.

Stuart Williamson testified that he did not slur his

co-workers in August 1996 and that he felt there was not
justification for Morton International, Inc. to terminate his
employment.

T. page 30, lines 3-25; pages 31-34.

Three co-

workers testified that they did not personally hear Stuart
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Williamson slur his co-workers in August, 1996. T. page 97,
lines 18-25; pages 98-119; page 120, lines 1-21.
8.

Stuart Williamson testified that he did not seek review

of his termination nor seek legal redress because he didn't think
it would do any good.

T. page 77, lines 21-25; page 78, lines 1-

17.
9.

Stuart Williamson obtained new employment with his

brother's drywall company where he is paid $11.00 per hour. T.
page 36, lines 1-5.
10.

Stuart Williamson, and his brother, Kirk Williamson for

whom Stuart works, testified that because of age and health
concerns, Stuart Williamson was not as productive as he once was,
but earned his $11 an hour.

T. page 14, lines 16-25; page 15,

lines 1-20; page 55, lines 9-25, pages 56-57; page 58, lines 1-6;
page 122, lines 1-22; page 124, lines 24-25; page 125; page 126,
lines 1-11.
Mr. Vlahos. Okay. Now in reference to your brother
would you tell the Court the circumstances surrounding him
coming to work for you?
A. He showed up one, one afternoon and asked me for a
job and said he'd been down to Heaps Drywall. And I said
sure, I'll put you to work. So I hired him on and he told
me that, you know, he hasn't drywalled for a while and he's
not in too good a shape and his shoulder is sore. I mean,
he was honest with me up front and said I'm not the man I
used to be. So I started him out at $11 an hour and—.
Q.

Is that what he still earns?

A. That's what he still earns. And you know, that's
companies around that, that will pay more and, and I, you
8

know, I'd pay Kim more too but he doesn't, he doesn't know
how to hang. Well, he can hang but not very efficient. He
doesn't know how to do metal stud framing. He doesn't know
how to do T-bar ceiling or, you know, most of Kim's life
he's been a taper.
Q. Okay. So are you paying him a salary that would be
commensurate with a taper?
A. Yes.
A. I'm paying him like I would pay anybody else,
brother or not. It's the way we were raised. If you're
worth it you get it, if you're not —
I can't afford to pay
him any more.
Q.

Why?

A. He could go to work somewhere else maybe for two to
three months and get $13.00 an hour. When the company got
slow they'd lay him off or when they found out that he
wasn't cutting it for $13 they'd lay him off. Then he'd go
to another company. I mean he, he's secure here. I mean,
he's got a job as, as long as he wants to stay here and can,
you know, perform. If, if he gets, if his should gets worse
and he continues to gain weight and can't bend over and do
his job then he's he's going to be, his price is going down,
you know, his hourly wage.
Q. How does, how does bursitis or whatever on his
shoulder, how does that affect his ability to do the job?
A. Well he's, his shoulders are not as strong as they
used to be so he doesn't carry a full hod full of mud
anymore because he can't hold the weight.
Q.

Okay.

A. Plus he can't run a full range of motion with his
trowel cause he's you know, it's just not strong enough and
capable of pulling it so his, his strokes are limited. And
you know in, in drywall it's, like I said before it's
competitive. There's only so much money in the job or
you're losing money. And sad to say we all get older and
slow down.
Q.

I hate to say it but you're right.
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What about carpal tunnel in his wrists?
affect his job?
A.

It does because his hand go numb.

Q.

Have you seen that happen?

A.

I have.

Q.

On more than one occasion?

A.

Yes. Nearly every day.

Does that

Q. Have you seen the affect that his bursitis and/or
arthritis has had on his shoulder and his ability to do the
job?
A.

Yes, I have.

Q.

On more than one occasion?

A. Yes.
Q.

On a regular basis?

A. It's a, it's a nearly every day occurrence. And
it's sad to say. Kim at one time was, was one of the best
drywall men in the business, extremely talented. I should
say taper. But he's, he's not the man he used to be.
Q. These other areas he has no expertise at all I take
it then.
A. He's, he's learning how to do it but he's learning
on a basis of, you know, our pay scale goes from minimum
wage on up to $15 an hour. But he's, on an average scale
he's, he's an $8, $9 an hour man if you were to take him in
a full perspective.
A. T-bar is just grid ceiling system. Metal stud
framing is a different aspect of it. So we try to keep Kim
on taping as much as possible. But we also are branched out
into stucco exterior where his skills of spreading the mud,
you know he's, he's still very talented but he's, he's slow.
Q. Why is that?
A.

Age, bursitis, wrist trouble, overweight.
10

Q.

Let me ask you this.

Has he worked overtime for

A.

A couple occasions yes, he has.

you?

Q. And has he volunteered to do overtime?
refused overtime? Let's put it that way.
A.

Has he ever

No, he hasn't.

Q. Okay.
A. I7ve mean Kim i s — It's, it's pretty tough for
him, you know, t o — I mean I, when I was growing up Kim
basically trained me in a lot, in a lot of the parts of
drywall. And not it's, it's kind of tough for him to, to
see the younger generation, you know, basically showing him
up.
Q. Are you paying him more or less than what he is
really capable and what he is really capable of doing for
the job and work that he has?
A.

Kim is, is holding his own at $11 an hour.

T. pages 122-128.
11.

Joan Williamson's income at Bourns increased from $8.32

per hour at the time of the divorce (May 1996) to $9.32 per hour
at the time of the modification trial (February 1998).
132, lines 12-25; pages 133, line 1.

T. page

Joan Williamson had some

overtime at Bourns in 1997. T. page 156, lines 7-14.

Joan

Williamson took an additional part-time job at King's a
department store, in September, 1997 to supplement her income.
T. page 141, lines 8-19; page 154 lines 10-25; page 155, lines 119.
12.

At trial, Joan Williamson presented a monthly budget of

$2,288.35 for herself and the parties' daughter which included
11

her mortgage payment on her new home.

Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 9;

T. page 142, lines 16-25; pages 143-144.
13.

At trial, Stuart Williamson presented a monthly budget

of $1,811.00 which did not include expenses for his current wife,
most, if not all of which, were split off by Stuart Williamson,
during his testimony, on the basis that his current wife could
pay for her expenses out of her income.

Defendant's Exhibit No.

1; T. page 45, lines 2-25; pages 46-49; page 50, lines 1-22.
14.

The trial court found that "there has been a change of

circumstances".
15.

T. page 180, lines 14-15.

The trial court found Stuart Williamson's gross income

at Williamson Drywall, Inc. to be $2,090.00 per month, which
would include overtime of $200.00 per month.
4-9.

T. page 44, lines

R. 197 (Findings of Fact, numbered paragraph 7); T. page

180, lines 16-18.
16.

The trial court found Joan Williamson's gross monthly

income to be $1,643.00 at Bourns, although the court was not
quite sure how that amount of income came up other than's Stuart
Williamson's representations through his counsel.

The court came

up with a gross income for Joan Williamson in 1997 of $1,832.66
gross per month, but accepted the figure of $1,692.56, including
some overtime at Bourns, and Joan Williamson's second job where
she earned $75.00 gross per month.

R. 197 (Findings of Fact,

paragraph 8, 9); T. page 181, lines 15-21.
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17.

After making its findings on the income of the parties,

the trial court ruled:

"I'm going to terminate alimony.

Now to

make this effective, and the Court paints this in broad strokes,
I've often said that in the past and I'll reemphasize that here
today."
18.

T. page 181, lines 22-25.
Joan Williamson's attorney pressed the Court on the

alimony issue, pointing out the $400.00 per month income
disparity, to which the trial court finally responded that it was
"close enough".

T. page 184, lines 2-25; page 185; page 186,

lines 1-2.
19.

The trial judge ordered a reduction in the payment of

child support, effective the 1st of March, 1998, based on the
gross incomes of Joan Williamson at $1,692.00 and Stuart
Williamson at $2,090.00. T. page 180, lines 14-21; T. page 182,
lines 9-11.
20.

The trial court accepted both parties' proffers of

$1,500.00 attorneys fees and ordered each party to pay his/her
own attorneys fees and costs. T. page 145, lines 15-23; page
161, lines 9-16; R. 196-203; T. page 183, lines 1-2.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
I.

The trial court did not commit error in failing to make

findings on nearly all material issues, as there were sufficient
findings by the trial court when supplemented with the facts in
the record that were clear and uncontroverted to only support the

13

judgment or there is no mandate to make a finding of fact as to a
particular issue as requested by the petitioner.

The drafter

(the petitioner) failed to draft appropriate findings.
II.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in

terminating alimony based on a substantial change in
circumstances, as it appropriately considered the three mandated
elements to determine alimony and the trial court attempted to
equalize the parties' respective standards of living at this
time, taking into consideration the large income reduction of
Stuart Williamson due to no fault of his own.
III.

Joan Williamson is not entitled to attorneys fees or

costs in the case at trial nor on appeal, as there was no abuse
of discretion by the trial court where evidence that should have
been proffered or given by Joan Williamson is not present.
ARGUMENTS
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE SUFFICIENT AS
EITHER FOUND BY THE TRIAL JUDGE OR AS FOUND IN THE FACTS OF THE
CASE TO SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT.
The trial court's findings in this case are sufficient to
support the judgment entered by the trial judge by themselves
and/or by supplementing them with the facts of the case. In
Whitehouse v. Whitehouser 790 P.2d 57 (Utah App. 1990), at page
61, the court held that "Trial courts enjoy broad discretion in
deciding whether a decree of divorce should be modified due to a
substantial change of circumstances."
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The court also held in

Whitehouse that "the trial court must make findings on all
material issues, and its failure to delineate what circumstances
have changed and why these changes support the modification made
in the prior divorce decree constitutes reversible error unless
the facts in the record are clear, uncontroverted and only
support the judgment."

(Emphasis added.)

A careful review of the facts in the record on each of the
issues presented for review by Joan Williamson under
subparagraphs IA, B, C, D, and E demonstrates that "the facts in
the record are clear, uncontroverted and only support the
judgment" to the point that even if this court finds that the
trial court failed to make findings on all material issues, the
ruling does not constitute reversible error and therefore the
trial court's decision should be affirmed.
IA.

The Petitioner, at trial, requested that the court

impute to Stuart Williamson his prior monthly income of $3,550.00
from Morton International, Inc. for purposes of child support and
alimony on the alleged basis that the respondent was voluntarily
terminated or involuntarily terminated due to unsatisfactory job
performance.
The Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7.6 (6) and (7) includes
imputed income as gross income to a parent, but states as a
condition of imputing income, that "Income may not be imputed to
a parent unless the parent stipulates to the amount imputed or a

15

hearing is held and a finding made that the parent is voluntarily
unemployed or underemployed*If

If income is imputed based on a

stipulation or finding by the court that the parent is
voluntarily unemployed or underemployed then the imputed income
shall be based upon employment potential and probable earnings,
etc. as found in subsection (b). Without a stipulation between
the parties as to imputed income, the court must have a hearing
and make a finding of voluntary unemployment, or as alleged in
this case, underemployment.
(Utah Ct. App. 1998) and

See Griffith v. Griffith. 344 UAR 3

Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah Ct.

App. 1993).
The trial court did not make a finding of underemployment.
The court did find that the Kim Williamson's monthly income was
$2,090.00.

The statute does not require a finding that the

respondent/parent was not underemployed, it only requires, in
order to impute income, in this particular case, a finding of
underemployment, which the trial court did not find.
The record as cited is replete with testimony by the Stuart
Williamson, and by Mr. Williamson's employer, of Stuart
Williamson's ability to work and of his income at his current
employment.

There is also testimony by Kim Pitcher, as offered

by the petitioner, of wages paid for similar work done.
Testimony was given and proffered as to the respondent's
termination from his previous employment with Morton.
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All of

this was considered by the trial court and no finding was made,
as none had to be made, as to the Stuart Williamson's alleged
underemployment.
Subsection (c) of the statute imputes minimum wage if the
parent has no work history, which is not applicable here, as the
Mr. Williamson/parent was working and had a work history.
Subsection (d) lists four reasons, not applicable here, in which
income would not be imputed.
The Order of the trial court on this issue should therefore
be affirmed as there was no requirement of the trial court to
make a finding of underemployment.
IB.

As argued, above in response to subparagraph IA of the

petitioner's Issues Presented for Review, the trial court did not
make a finding of voluntary underemployment as he did not have to
if the trial judge was not going to impute income to Mr.
Williamson.

Also a careful review of the facts in the record are

clear, uncontroverted and only support the judgment by the court
on the issue of the alleged voluntary underemployment such that
the Order of the trial court on this issue should be affirmed.
IC.

The petitioner on this issue for review is requesting

that the trial court be found in error for failing to make
findings on the effect of the Mr. Williamson's new spouse's
contributions to the their household in considering Mr.
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Williamson's needs and ability to pay alimony under the Utah Code
Annotated §30-3-5 (7) (g) (iii).
This statute states that "in determining alimony, the income
of a subsequent spouse of the payor may not be considered, except
as provided in this subsection.

The exceptions to the rule of

not considering a subsequent spouse's income are: (1) the
subsequent spouse's financial ability to share living expense; or
(2) the court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse if
the court finds that the payor's improper conduct justifies that
consideration.
The trial court did not make a finding of fact as to the
subsequent spouse's income as there was no requirement that such
a finding be made, as the court did not consider that income.
Mr. Williamson's current wife's income was never presented in
evidence by either Joan Williamson or Stuart Williamson. Ms.
Williamson's attorney questioned Mr. Williamson as to his current
wife's employment in regard to insurance but failed to question
him as to his current wife's income. T. page 76, line 22.
In fact, Mr. Williamson in his Exhibit # 1 did, in
calculating his expenses and income, deduct from his living
expenses, in arriving at his expenses of $1,833.00, the sum of
$600.00, which he attributed to his current wife as her share of
the mortgage and utilities.
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With these facts in the record there was no justifiable
reason to consider or make a judicial finding as to a
consideration of Mr. Williamson's current spouses's financial
ability to share living expenses, as this was already done by the
respondent in his Exhibit # 1.

Nor was there a reason to

consider the income of Mr. Williamson's current wife as there was
not any improper conduct alleged on the part of Mr. Williamson to
justify that consideration.
ID.

The court did make findings as to the parties' gross

incomes and a review of the facts in the record, with the direct
and cross-examination of each of the parties on their respective
incomes, expenses, work history, health, questions of
underemployment, and evidence of incomes at the time of the
Divorce, marshals enough facts to show that the facts in the
record are clear, uncontroverted and only support the judgment as
a consideration of the parties' needs and respective abilities to
meet those needs relative to alimony and an "equalization of the
parties' respective standards of living.
After the trial court ruled, Joan Williamson's counsel
continued to argue with the trial judge as to a disparity in the
parties' gross incomes of $400.00, $200.00 or $100.00 and the
trial judge, in concluding and affirming his decision of a
termination of alimony stated,
manipulation.

"Well I appreciate your

But he's making $2,100.00, she's making $1,700.00.
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He gives her $250.00, she gets $250.00. And he's $100.00 in the
hole.

That's the way the Court looks at it." T. page 185, lines

19-23.

The court considered the parties7 incomes and expenses

and other obligations, as can be gleamed from the trial record,
as required by law and ruled that alimony should terminate based
on a substantial change in circumstances.

The facts in the

record are clear, uncontroverted and only support the judgment on
this issue.
Accordingly, the trial court did not commit error in failing
to make findings on this issue of the appeal and the trial court
should therefore be affirmed.
IE.

In interpreting U.C.A. §30-3-3(1), the Utah Supreme

Court held as follows in Beardall v. Beardall, 629 P.2d 425 (Utah
1981):
Although there was no detailed presentation of facts
establishing the usual requisite factors to support an award
of attorney's fees, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in awarding attorneys fees to plaintiff to enable
her to prosecute an action to enforce a provision of divorce
decree where the facts implicit in the proceeding and the
evidence necessarily presented to the trial court, together
with the deminimis nature of the award, constituted a
sufficient basis to sustain the exercise of the trial
court's discretion.
In this case, the trial court found that each party should
pay their own attorneys fees and costs, such that it was not
necessary to consider or rule on the reasonableness of Joan
Williamson's attorneys fees and costs. There is no evidence by
counsel as to the reasonableness of his attorneys fees or costs
20

nor was evidence specifically presented as to Joan Williamson's
need for payment of the attorneys fees and costs by Mr.
Williamson.
But the facts in the record are replete with evidence as to
the parties7 gross incomes and expenses and ability to pay for
their obligations, including attorneys fees and costs. The facts
in the record are clear, uncontroverted and only support the
judgment such that the trial court's ruling that each party pay
their own attorneys fees and costs should be affirmed under the
analysis of Beardall.
Although the Mr. Williamson's attorney was ordered to
prepare the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order in
this matter, Joan Williamson's attorney took it upon himself to
prepare the documents and submit them to the court without Mr.
Williamson's approval as to form and the pleading, accordingly,
should be construed against the drafter.
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN TERMINATING THE
ALIMONY AWARD TO THE PETITIONER BASED ON THE FACTS OR STATUTORY
AND JUDICIAL MANDATES.
Due to no fault of Stuart Williamson, he lost his job
earning $3,550.00 gross per month and had to return to a
construction job, taping, similar to the one he had abandoned
five years earlier, due to health and physical problems that are
now only more pronounced.

The involuntary change in employment

and return to previous employment resulted in a drastic change in
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income and lifestyle for Mr. Williamson.

Stuart Kim Williamson

is now required to do manual labor, resulting in numbness to his
extremities on almost a daily basis, earning a little more than
one half of his previous monthly income or the sum of $2,090.00
as found by the court.

In the meantime, Joan Williamson's income

and lifestyle have increased, a fractionally amount, to just
under $1,700.00 as found by the court, but based on her earnings
of 1997, over $1,800.00 a month.
Joan Williamson's expenses include those of the parties'
minor child, and a contribution of about 14% of her income to a
retirement fund for future use. T. page 160, lines 5-24.

This

retirement money could be used to pay Ms. Williamson's expenses,
representing about $250.00 a month.

Stuart Kim Williamson cashed

out his ESIP retirement and paid one-half of that to Joan
Williamson.

T. page 160-161. Mr. Williamson has no retirement

benefits nor any health insurance benefits through his current
employer.
In Whitehouse, at page 61, Id., this court found that "A
court has continuing jurisdiction to modify a divorce decree.
Cites omitted.

However, a party requesting that a divorce decree

be modified must demonstrate that there has been 'a substantial
change of circumstances' occurring since the entry of the decree
and not contemplated in the decree itself."

The trial judge

found a change in circumstances in favor of Mr. Williamson.
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The Whitehouse case further held at page 61:
The change necessary to justify a modification of a
decree of divorce varies with the type of modification
contemplated. Provisions dealing with alimony and child
support are more susceptible to alteration at a later date
because the needs that such provisions are intended to
fulfill are subject to rapid and unpredictable change.
The trial courts enjoy broad discretion in deciding whether
a decree of divorce should be modified due to a substantial
change of circumstances.

See Jense v. Jense. 784 P.2d 1249 (Ct.

App. 1989)
Also "[I]t is well established that in divorces, trial
courts are given considerable discretion in adjusting the
parties7 financial and property interests, and their actions are
entitled to a presumption of validity."

Burnham v. Burnham, 716

P.2d 781, 782 (Utah 1986); and Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d 1201,
1203 (Utah 1983).

To overcome the presumption, the appealing

party must demonstrate that "there was a misunderstanding or
misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and
prejudicial error; or the evidence clearly preponderated against
the findings; or such a serious inequity has resulted as to
manifest a clear abuse of discretion."

See Ruhsam v. Ruhsam. 742

P.2d 123, 124 (Utah App. 1987).
In a case involving alimony the trial court is mandated to
meet the requirements of Godfrey v. Godfreyf 854 P.2d 585, 589
(Utah App. 1993) in considering the financial conditions and
needs of the receiving spouse; the ability of the receiving
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spouse to produce sufficient income; and the ability of the
supporting spouse to provide support, and to the extent possible,
to equalize the parties' respective standards of living."

Not

necessarily their respective gross or net incomes.
As argued earlier, the facts in the record and the trial
court's findings support the judgment of a termination of
alimony.

The trial record is replete with evidence as to Joan

Williamson's conditions and needs.

She set forth and testified

as to her expenses and her ability to meet those expenses.
Evidence was presented as to Joan Williamson's income or ability
to produce sufficient income with the court's finding that she
earned just under $1,700.00 gross per month, when in fact the
trial court found that her gross income for the previous year was
over $1,800.00 a month.
There is considerable evidence as to Stuart Kim Williamson's
gross income and a finding by the court that he makes $2,090.00
gross per month including $200.00 in overtime pay.

There was no

income imputed to the respondent and no finding as to
underemployment with the testimony of both Williamsons as to Mr.
Williamson's income.

There was testimony submitted and proffered

as to Mr. Williamson's termination and the facts surrounding it
by lead men that worked with him, which facts were not refuted.
With all of this evidence, the court attempted with a
finding of a substantial changes in circumstances to equalize the
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parties7 respective standards of living.

The trial court is not

required to equalize the parties7 respective incomes, but to
equalize, to the extent possible, taking into consideration the
three elements of needs and income and ability to pay, their
respective standards of living and maintain them at a level as
close as possible to that standard of living enjoyed during the
marriage.
The court in its ruling, considered the parties7 standards
of living.

After extensive argument, by Joan Williamson7s

counsel,, after the court7s ruling, the court explained that it
had considered the incomes of the parties and found that with the
payment of child support by Mr. Williamson to Ms. Williamson that
Mr. Williamson was in the hole about $100.00 a month, if income
disparity was considered in the manner that petitioner7s counsel
was arguing the court should.

Earlier in the court7s ruling, the

trial judge held that considering the length of the marriage of
24 years, that, "when you take into account the child support
that [Stuart Williamson] would pay and that [Joan Williamson]
would receive and their actual incomes, etcetera, the Court finds
that7s close enough.

The etcetera would have included a

consideration of the parties7 expenses, ability to pay and
incomes of the parties.
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Accordingly, the alimony obligation was appropriately
considered by the trial court under both the statutory and
judicial mandates and terminated without abusing its discretion.
III. JOAN WILLIAMSON IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF HER
ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS FROM THE TRIAL NOR ON APPEAL.
The Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-3 (1) allows the trial court
to order a party to pay the costs, attorney fees, and witness
fees of the other party to enable the other party to prosecute or
defend the action and the order may include a provision for costs
of the action.
In applying this statute or in awarding attorneys fees and
costs on the trial court level, the appellant courts have held
that the decision to award attorney fees and the amount of
attorneys fees, in divorce proceedings, rests primarily in the
sound discretion of the trial court.

However, the award must be

based on evidence of both financial need and reasonableness.

See

Rasband v. Rasband. 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Andersen
v. Andersen, 757 P.2d 476 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Morgan v. Morgan,
795 P.2d 684 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Crouse v. Crouse. 817 P.2d 836
(Utah Ct. App. 1991); and Wilde v. Wilde. 357 UAR 29 (Utah Ct.
App. 1998).

In order to award attorney fees, the trial court

must find the requesting party in need of financial assistance
and that the fees requested are reasonable.

Riche v. Riche, 784

P.2d (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Bagshaw v. Bagshaw, 788 P.2d 1057
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(Utah Ct. App. 1990); Haumont v. Haumont. 793 P.2d 421 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990; and Wilde v. Wilde, 357 UAR 29 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
In deciding on an award of attorneys fees and costs, among
other factors, the court may consider the difficulty of the
litigation, the efficiency of the attorneys, the reasonableness
of the number of hours spent on the case, the fee customarily
charged in the locality, the amount involved in the case and the
result attained, and the expertise and experience of the
attorneys involved.

None of this was testified to by Joan

Williamson nor presented by her attorney.
In Warren v. Warren, 655 P.2d 684 (Utah 1982), the Utah
Supreme Court held that the trial court properly denied the
wife's request for attorney fees in the divorce proceedings where
she offered no evidence at trial to show the nature or amount of
any attorney fees incurred or any need for court-ordered
assistance in the payment of such fees.

(Emphasis added).

In

Kallas v. Kallasf the Utah Supreme Court found it an abuse of the
trial court's discretion to award attorney fees to the mother in
a child custody modification proceeding where there was no
presentation of facts establishing her financial need for such an
award.

614 P.2d 641 (Utah 1980).

The trial court accepted both parties' proffers of $1,500.00
in attorneys fees and costs. No evidence was presented
specifically, by either party as to the reasonableness of the
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attorneys fees nor the financial need of Ms. Williamson for an
award of attorneys fees and costs.

Based on the evidence before

the trial court, it found that each of the parties should pay
their own attorneys fees and costs.
As to an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal, this
court in Wilde v. Wilde. 357 UAR 29, 31, exercised its discretion
in awarding attorneys fees and costs on appeal because the
defendant there had prevailed in large part on appeal.

But in

this case no attorneys fees nor costs have been awarded on the
trial level, Mr. Williamson prevailed in large part on the trial
level, no evidence has been detailed as to the need of Ms.
Williamson as to attorneys fees and costs on appeal, such that no
attorneys fees and costs should be awarded on appeal.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's judgment is sufficiently supported by the
evidence of the case and his findings such that his ruling should
be affirmed and no attorneys fees nor costs awarded unless they
are awarded to Mr. Williamson on appeal.
DATED this

) Y

day of January, 1999.
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